• French

The new “caliphate” of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—the Islamic State, formerly “ISIS”—recently made clear that it means to follow in the footsteps of the original caliphate of Abu Bakr al-Sadiq (632-634), specifically by directing its jihad against fellow Muslims, in Islamic parlance, the “hypocrites” and “apostates,” or in Western terminology, “moderates.”

This came out in the context of the current conflict between Israel and Hamas, with some Muslims asking the newly formed “caliphate” when it would launch a jihad on the Jewish state.

The Islamic State’s response is that “Allah in the noble Koran does not command us to fight Israel or the Jews until we fight the apostates and hypocrites.”

On one of the Islamic State’s question-and-answer websites, some asked why it was “not fighting Israel but instead shedding the blood of the sons of Iraq and Syria.” The new caliphate responded:

The greater answer is in the noble Koran, when Allah Almighty speaks about the near enemy. In the majority of verses in the noble Koran, these are the hypocrites, for they pose a greater danger than the original infidels [born non-Muslims, e.g., Jews and Christians]. And the answer is found in Abu Bakr al-Sadiq, when he preferred fighting apostates over the conquest of Jerusalem [fath al-Quds], which was conquered by his successor, Omar al-Khattab.

There’s much to be said about this response, rife as it is with historical allusions.

First, it is true. After the prophet of Islam died, a great number of Arabian tribes that had submitted to his rule by becoming Muslims—the word muslim simply means “one who submits”—thought they could now renege, and so they apostatized in droves. This sparked the first Ridda, or “apostasy wars,” waged by Abu Bakr al-Sadiq, who became the first caliph on Muhammad’s death in 632. For nearly two years, till his own death in 634, his caliphate’s entire energy was focused on waging jihad on all the recalcitrant Arab tribes, forcing them by the edge of the sword to return to the fold of Islam.

Tens of thousands of Arabs were burned, beheaded, dismembered, or crucified in the process, according to Islamic history, especially by the “Sword of Allah.” It was only afterwards, under the reign of the second caliph, Omar al-Khattab (634-644), that the great Islamic conquests against the “original infidels”—those non-Arab peoples who had never converted to Islam, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, etc.—took place.

Islam’s war on the apostate, so little known in the West, figures prominently in Islamic history. Indeed, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, one of the most influential Islamic clerics today, while once discussing the importance of killing any Muslim who apostatizes from Islam on Al Jazeera, correctly stated that “If the [death] penalty for apostasy was ignored, there would not be an Islam today; Islam would have ended on the death of the prophet.”

In short, and as the Islamic State is now arguing, the first and greatest enemy of Islam—the “nearest” enemy—is the “apostate” and “hypocrite,” for they are the most capable of subverting Islam from within.

This phenomenon of “pious” Muslims fighting and killing “lukewarm” Muslims, or Shia and Sunnis fighting one another—while the original infidel stands by or gets away—has many precedents throughout history. For example, in its response, the Islamic State further justifies not fighting Israel by saying:

The answer is found in Salah ad-Din al-Ayubi [Saladin] and Nur ad-Din Zanki when they fought the Shia in Egypt and Syria before [addressing] Jerusalem. Salah ad-Din fought more than 50 battles before he reached Jerusalem. And it was said to Salah ad-Din al-Ayubi: “You fight the Shia and the Fatimids in Egypt and allow the Latin Crusaders to occupy Jerusalem?” And he responded: “I will not fight the Crusaders while my back is exposed to the Shia.”

All of this history quoted by the Islamic State is meant to exonerate the new caliphate’s main assertion: “Jerusalem will not be liberated until we are done with all these tyrants, families, and pawns of colonialism that control the fate of the Islamic world.”

Some observations:

• Although the Islamic State is trying to suggest that only autocrats like Syria’s Bashar al-Assad are “apostates” and “hypocrites,” and that most average Muslims are eager for Sharia, the fact is, a great many of the world’s Muslims fit under this rubric. The largest revolution in history, Egypt’s June 2013 anti-Brotherhood revolution, attests to this. Thus the new caliphate’s jihad is not just against “tyrants,” but many average Muslims as well, as the organization’s carnage in Iraq and Syria attests.
• The Islamic State’s declaration justifying non-confrontation with Israel is not winning it much popular support in the Arab world and is naturally portrayed as a copout. It further validates the popular Arab narrative that the United States is siding with the Islamists to create havoc in the region; to have the various sects (Sunni vs Shia, Moderate vs. Islamist) fight each other in order to divide and weaken the region. Thus Dr. Ahmed Karima, a leading professor of Islamic jurisprudence in Al Azhar, said that the Islamic State’s position concerning Israel proves that “it is a creation of U.S. and Israeli intelligence” and that the new caliphate “is the biggest of all hypocrites.”
• Alternatively, others, especially Islamists, appreciate that the Islamic State is patterning itself after the first caliphate of Abu Bakr—hence why its first caliph chose that name—because it finds itself operating in the same circumstances. Nascent and without much support, it first mission, like Abu Bakr, is to re-subjugate Muslims to Islam. Only then can it focus on the “original infidels.”
• While this approach may be temporarily good for Israel (and all infidel states), in the long run, a fully functioning and unified caliphate with “reformed” Muslims next door is not a pretty picture — especially if it acquires weapons of mass destruction. After all, the Islamic State is not exonerating the infidel, but rather saying his turn will come once the caliphate is capable of an all-out assault. At best, it’s a temporary reprieve.

Jihad Watch

During a recent Arabic program devoted to how religions view marriage, Islamic clerics endeavored to answer the host’s question, “Why does Islam permit exactly four wives, as opposed to only one or more than four?

One of these clerics responded by saying that, before Islam, there was no limit to how many wives an Arab man could have. But when Koran 4:3 appeared, telling Muslim men to “Marry such women as seem good to you, two and three and four,” a man came to Islam’s prophet Muhammad saying, I have 19 wives, what do I do now? Muhammad told him, keep four and divorce the rest.

The cleric then said that in another hadith, Muhammad said a woman should be married for one of four reasons: 1) her beauty, 2) her lineage, 3) her wealth, and 4) her piety.

However, argued the cleric, it is impossible to find all four traits in one woman. That is why a Muslim man, who deserves the best that womanhood can offer, is permitted to have four wives—ideally, one that represents each of the four aforementioned traits sought after in women.

• Portuguese

Coptic Solidarity

The above picture recently appeared on several Arabic social media and websites. Its caption says: "First female slave market in Deir ez-Zur," a Syrian region that is 20 percent Christian and is currently occupied by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

Regardless of its origin or authenticity, it’s true significance is that it perfectly relays what we do know is going on in Syria — from fatwas permitting men to rape women, to fatwas calling on women to engage in the sex jihad, including against their will.

The jihadis are demanding sexual satisfaction and rewards for their sacrifices, and they are getting it.

This is a reminder of what Abu Ishaq al-Huwaini, a popular Salafi preacher in Egypt, said on Hikma TV back in 2011. He explained that after jihadi conquests, the properties and persons of "infidel" inhabitants are to be seized as ghanima, or “spoils of war,” distributed among the Muslim jihadis or taken to “the slave market, where slave-girls and concubines are sold.”

Huwaini referred to these sex slaves by the dehumanizing appellation that the Koran gives them, ma malakat aymanukum—“what [not whom] your right hands possess”—in this context, sex-slaves: “You go to the market and buy her, and she becomes like your legal mate—though without a contract, a guardian, or any of that stuff—and this is agreed upon by the ulema. In other words, when I want a sex-slave, I go to the market and pick whichever female I desire and buy her.”

But of course this notion does not originate with Huwaini. In Koran 4:3 Allah commands Muslim men to “Marry such women as seem good to you, two and three and four… or what your right hands possess.” As Huwaini points out, Islam’s ulema, or “scholars,” are unanimously agreed that “what your right hands possess” is simply a sex-slave taken during a jihad raid. Linguistic evidence further suggests that she is seen more as an animal or a possession than a human—hence their inhuman treatment, as possessions to be bought and sold (and as recently confirmed by a top ranking Egyptian Salafi).